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Israel’s nuclear policy troubles law, but does not
violate it. The World Court (International Court of
Justice/ICJ) delivered its 1996 Advisory Opinion
on the use of nuclear weapons without mentioning
Israel. But the Jewish state sat beyond the bar as
the elephant in the courtroom. Numerous United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions on nuclear weapons had
preceded the one that requested this Court’s advisory opinion — some of
those resolutions had singled out Israel for criticism of its nuclear program.
The linkage to this case was clear. By finding the use of nuclear weapons
generally illegal, the Court pleased the anti-Israel General Assembly
majority. By failing to find an absolute prohibition on use and failing to
find any prohibition on possession, the Court undoubtedly disappointed
that majority.
The world community creates international law by two principal
means. First, if two or more states agree to a course of action or a set of
rules — for example, to charge no more than specified tariffs on each other’s
imports — that treaty binds them legally. The agreement does not bind other
states that are not parties to it. Second, if the overwhelming majority of
states follow a particular practice among themselves — for example, not
arresting one another’s diplomats — and if they believe that practice to be
required, such a custom is an international law.
No world parliament exists. No global body can legislate. Thus, the
UNGA does not make laws. It passes “resolutions” that do not have binding
effect (understandable for a body where a mini-state like Lichtenstein or
the Bahamas has the same one vote as mammoth countries like India and
China). Neither does the UN Security Council (UNSC) create generally
applicable law. It does issue binding legal orders applicable to specific state
parties who, it finds, threaten international peace and security in particular
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situations. Such resolutions are not general international laws — they are
only orders to the parties involved.
The UN Charter (UNC) provides the most powerful collection of
rules of international law from any single source. Virtually all states have
ratified this treaty and, therefore, the entire world is legally bound by its
provisions. No other international agreement comes close to its substantive
scope of coverage and its universality of acceptance. The Charter establishes
the ICJ as the judicial arm of the UN. That court may settle legal questions
brought before it by contending state parties, thus promoting one of the UN’s
principal aims — the peaceful settlement of disputes and the avoidance of
armed conflict. The ICJ possesses a secondary judicial power — to render
advisory opinions to the UNGA or UNSC when either of those bodies so
requests (UNC Article 96). While not legally binding, such an opinion is the
most authoritative view of what international custom or treaties require. The
General Assembly requested such an Advisory Opinion in 1996 regarding
the legality of nuclear weapons.

The World Court Advisory Opinion
In its Advisory Opinion of July 8, 1996 (“Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons”), the ICJ responded to the UNGA’s question: “Is
the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under
international law?” The opinion did respond generally to the UNGA’s
inquiry, but left uncertain legal issues pertaining to particular circumstances.
The international legality of Israel’s nuclear posture appears to lie within
the ICJ opinion’s zone of uncertainty.
The opinion reached the following conclusions:
First, no treaty of universal application either authorizes or absolutely
outlaws the use of nuclear weapons. The Court here is cognizant of the
legally obvious — that only parties to a treaty are bound by it. However,
since virtually all states have ratified the UNC, any use of nuclear weapons
must overcome the very high hurdle of Article 2 Paragraph 4, which
prohibits “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state....” The Court implies that no justification could
clear that hurdle except, perhaps, “self-defense” under UNC Article 51.
Second, no international law custom absolutely outlaws the use,
much less the possession of nuclear weapons. The “possession” part of
that conclusion is a no-brainer: Since custom can only be inferred from
uniform state practice, and since state practice reveals most of the world’s
major powers and its most populous nations possessing nuclear weapons,
no custom can exist that prohibits that possession. The Court recognized
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that the possession of nuclear weapons did not necessarily imply the intent
to use them offensively. Indeed, it took note o f the decades o f deterrence
that characterized the Cold War and implicitly accepted that deterrence
might be a justification for the possession o f such weapons. The use of
nuclear weapons is another matter. While the ICJ does not find an absolute
customary prohibition on their use, it comes pretty close. The Court
recognizes that international custom has long held (at least since the St.
Petersburg Declaration o f 1868) that a state’s discretion in resorting to
weaponry to harm the enemy is not unlimited. Its opinion reflects at least
four long-standing principles o f the laws of war — unnecessary suffering,
discrimination, necessity and proportionality.
The ICJ reaffirms in its Nuclear Weapons opinion that a weapon may not
inflict unnecessary suffering on human targets. Only that force necessary to
stop an enemy, not to make him suffer beyond incapacitation, is permitted.
The ICJ reaffirms that a weapon must reasonably discriminate between
combatants and non-combatants. Civilians, incapacitated wounded, surrendered
soldiers and non-arms-bearing medics are in the latter category.
The ICJ reaffirms that force used may not be disproportionate to the
justification for that force. Thus, customary law would prohibit destruction
o f an enemy’s entire military capacity in an otherwise justifiable armed
response against a small border incursion.

The World Court (International Court o f Justice/ICJ) delivered its 1996Advisory
Opinion on the use o f nuclear weapons without mentioning Israel.
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On each of these customary grounds — unnecessary suffering,
discrimination, necessity, and proportionality — the ICJ finds the use of
nuclear weapons generally illegal, but not necessarily in every conceivable
case. The vagueness of the Court’s language probably reflects division and
ambivalence within the tribunal. It suggests that there might be a situation
where a state’s existence was threatened that justified the defensive use
of nuclear weapons. The Court fails to elaborate on this exceptional
hypothetical situation.
Finally, the ICJ does find an obligation to negotiate “in good faith”
toward nuclear disarmament. Israel could arguably be breaching this duty,
but its requirements are vague. Would Israel’s asserted willingness to agree
to such disarmament in a phased application after a comprehensive Mideast
Peace Settlement meet its obligation? That seems debatable.
The application of the Court’s analysis to Israel’s legal posture
regarding nuclear weapons does not seem too difficult. Israel does not
appear presently to be violating any rule articulated by the Court. The mere
possession of nuclear weapons is not found to be illegal. No use of nuclear
weapons has occurred, so no violation exists there. The Court’s “existential”
exception to the general prohibition on use tends to support Israel’s implied
position that it would not engage in the first use of such weapons unless its
existence was threatened. Responding to the rather abstract question posed
by the UNGA, the Court had no occasion to address the circumstances
surrounding particular states’ possession of nuclear weapons, not Israel’s or
India’s or North Korea’s or anyone else’s. The Advisory Opinion contained
no “advice” regarding the legality of Israel’s policy of intentional ambiguity
— its practice of not officially affirming or denying its nuclear capability.
Generally speaking, international law permits that which it does not
prohibit. If there’s no law against it, it’s okay (legally, if not morally). The
Court recognized this principle in the Lotus Case. Such a principle flows
from the notion o f sovereignty: Except as explicitly limited by international
law or by its own agreement, every state is free and independent to carry
on its business as it sees fit. Since there is no treaty or custom that would
require Israel or any other state to reveal whether it possesses nuclear
weapons, there is no law that it is violating in that regard.
Perhaps an argument could be formulated that purposeful ambiguity
regarding a state’s own possession of nuclear weapons so intimidates
its potential enemies that such ambiguity amounts to a threat of force
in violation of Article 2 of the UNC. However, no authoritative source
establishes this proposition. Furthermore, the logic of such an argument
weakens when considering that overt possession of nuclear weapons is legal.
98

PALESTINE-ISRAEL JOURNAL

Certainly, if covert possession constituted an illegal “threat” under UNC
Article 2, so would overt possession, which the ICJ does not find illegal.
The Court recognizes the possession-equals-threat argument in its opinion,
but does not accept it as law.
A number of the briefs submitted to the Court claimed that nuclear
weapons were illegal by virtue of international human rights and
environmental treaties and customs. The Court responded to these arguments
by noting that in dealing with the legality of the use of nuclear weapons, the
controlling specific international rules were to be found under the laws of
war. While environmental and human rights law might inform some of that
analysis, ultimately the law of war, as discussed above, had to control.

General Assembly Resolutions and Israel
The General Assembly has passed numerous resolutions regarding
nuclear weapons, including declarations of the weapons’ illegality and
of Israel’s need to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. As noted
above, UNGA resolutions are not law. However, they may be evidence of
international customary law, if they demonstrate the presence of uniform
international practice and of opinio juris, the universal recognition by
states of an obligatory norm. Regarding the illegality of nuclear weapons,
the practice of important states in possessing such weapons renders any
UNGA resolutions insufficient evidence of custom. Regarding Israel’s non
adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the pertinent resolutions stand
as moral and political exhortations — but no principle of international law
requires any state to become party to any treaty. In fact, the principle of
sovereignty supports the right of a state not to so adhere. Furthermore, unlike
the UNSC regarding threats to peace, the UNGA lacks any power to make
binding orders against Israel, any other state or any person whatsoever.

Can the Security Council Have Impact?
The last point raises an interesting possibility. Could the UNSC legally
order Israel to reveal the nature of its nuclear capability, or even order it
to disann? While politically unlikely, the theoretical answer is: “Possibly,
yes.” The UNC empowers the Security Council to take actions it deems
appropriate to address threats to international peace and security (UNC
Article 39). If the UNSC found that Israel’s policy of nuclear ambiguity or
its possession of nuclear weapons posed such a threat to peace, that body
has the legal competence to order remedial action. It further has the power to
impose sanctions if its orders are not followed (UNC Articles 41 and 42).
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Mutual Existential Fright
The Court’s Nuclear Weapons opinion implicitly raises the specter
of mutual existential fright, since it cites as its only example of a possibly
permissible use of atomic weapons a response to a threat to a state’s
existence. While the ICJ does not mention Israel in its opinion, the
applicability is obvious. Israeli officials, while not confirming possession
of nuclear weapons, seem to have implied that, if they exist, they would
be used in response to an immediate existential threat. One example might
be where the Israeli Air Force has been destroyed and enemy armies are
threatening to overrun Israeli population centers. Another would be if
weapons of mass destruction (e.g., chemical or biological) were being used
against such population centers. Perhaps, such officials would now add to
the list Iran actively arming nuclear warheads on long-range missiles. One
or more of these threats might meet the I d ’s “existential exception.”
Israel has cause for its existential fear. History — both ancient and
recent — need not be repeated here to establish that proposition.
However, when contemplating nuclear weapons, existential fear is
not a one-way street. Palestinians (and to some lesser degree other Arabs
and even Iranians) have quite rational grounds for trepidation. If Israel
were to exercise nuclear self-defense, who would be the victims, and how
wide would be the devastation? If Israel followed those international law
limitations of proportionality and discrimination described above, targeting
only military objectives with tactical weapons, perhaps the damage might
be merely awful, but not catastrophic. But it is not irrational for Arab
populations to fear that such nice lines might not be observed by the Israeli
military in time of perceived existential crisis.
Palestinians also have cause for existential fear, perhaps not historically
or geopolitically equivalent to that of Jews, but real nonetheless. Does
international law help at all with this dilemma of mutual existential fear?
The legal limits on the use of force (immediacy, necessity, proportionality,
discrimination, etc.) provide some brakes on the escalation to nuclear
devastation. This is true even where self-defense is invoked, since that
customary doctrine has long required that the threat responded to must be
immediate, and the response proportional and only that which is absolutely
necessary. Nuclear warfare would rarely meet these requirements.
While law is helpful, it is not sufficient. It cannot substitute for moral and
political reconciliation. Only when neither side can contemplate eliminating
the other will mutual existential fear disappear. A comprehensive treaty that
recognizes Israel and Palestine’s permanent existences and provides for
nuclear disarmament is the only legal document that will work.
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